Counter-Narrative to Islamophobia 6 (UK) looks at Removing hierarchies of racism and acknowledging Islamophobia as a form of racism. Find the full list of ten and their details here. This work was undertaken in 2017 – 18, and remains pertinent. The ten counter-narratives will be indexed on this site too here.
A repeated counter-narrative over several decades has been the invoking of the ’Jewish’ community as a model, whether by Muslims themselves (Rajina, 2017, Runnymede, 1997 and 2017) or by political figures (Cameron, 2007). Ameli et. al., discuss the wider implications of this with regard to faith communities (2006b). Their findings from qualitative and quantitative work, highlight Muslim expectations within the existing parameters of minority rights in the UK. The call for parity between minoritised and/or religious communities i.e. the acceptance of minority identity and the ‘benefits’ that go with it should be on a par across major religious minorities, or indeed across major religions (Beth Din courts, the Synod, Muslim arbitration). This can provide (i) examples of good (state) practice; (ii) a marker by which to measure the treatment of Muslims by the state; but counterintuitively (iii) can inhibit the improvement of the situation of Muslims but also (in this case) Jews, by using certain aspects of recognition of ‘Jewish’ identity as the final point of good practice regarding religious and or racialized communities in the UK.
Ahsan (2017) sounds a warning regarding monopolisation of narratives of suffering from whichever community, and emphasizes the need for there to be more than piecemeal or nominal shows of solidarity. In particular, he calls for a more interwoven understanding and solidarity between campaigns, causes and oppressed groups. He highlights his work with the Hillsborough Committee campaign, as well as referencing what he calls the ‘repeating pattern through other suspect communities’ including the Irish through the 1960s until the Good Friday agreement, the American-Japanese and their experience of internment, as well as the targeting of the white working class in the Orgreave Affair (demonised as striking miners) and the survivors and victims’ families after the Hillsborough Disaster (demonised as ‘scousers’): “…there is a repeating pattern through other suspect communities, obviously Irish people in the 70’s and the Japanese-Americans and their internment and so I view this as part of that wider branch of history and I am working closely with other communities… I went to the Orgreave (Miners’ Strike) and memorial on 33rd anniversary and I looked some of the language used by the Tory minister and there were things said by the minister, certain things like ‘extremist ways’ or ‘democratic ways’ and obviously phrases like that… similarly if you look at the language use against ‘scousers’ [Hillsborough] they are firstly blamed for their own death, they are blamed for their poverty, they are blamed…”
Also highlighting commonality of (potential) experience, Rajina (2017) highlights the existence and relative security of some Jewish schools in Stamford Hill, London where the experience and institutions of the Jewish community provide for her examples of good practice. In the maintaining of an Eastern-European, Yiddish speaking identity some eight generations or more after arrival in the UK, there is ample scope for Muslims to emulate and government and local authorities to adopt in their approach to Muslims. Rajina points to the fact that there are many schools in that community which are known to be failing schools but which have been largely left alone by the authorities because of the community’s ‘putting their foot down’. As an example to Muslim communities this is illustrative of how a confident and determined community can face off hostility from the authorities to maintain their access to the institutions without external harassment. Kundnani (2017) highlights that the Muslim community’s failure to draw a red line with the government over the Trojan Horse affair was a miscalculation, that has resulted in increased harassment. As a recommendation to civil society, establishing boundaries over issues affecting the community is part of a long-term strategy that has in the case of some parts of the Jewish community in the UK been shown to have effect. This example bucks the narrative of minority conditionality imposed by Cameron (2007) as resting upon a critical conversation between the state and racialised minorities. Cameron (2007) claimed that the demands for Muslims to reform had precedent in the conversations between state and non-Jewish communities on one side and the Jewish community on the other fifty years previously over the possible conflicts between their identity and Britishness. It is implied in his speech that an assimilationist track taken by the Jewish community has led to their full acceptance in British society and that this is the route Muslims in the UK must take. This speech forms the basis of much policy developed and rests upon and reproduces various Islamophobic narratives of Muslims as an internal threat, disloyal and incompatible with the nation. It also revives similar anti-Semitic tropes by reenvisioning the history of Jewish communities in the UK, as recent, conditional and entirely socialised to the state, and is worthy of examination and more treatment in regard to the rise of anti-Semitism in the UK in other research.
François (2017) highlights also: “the Jewish community; they have then had certain commissions put in place to assess the state of anti-Semitism in the UK and then policies can be devised off the back of those. We know that in the UK that has not been devised by the UK government in the same way for Muslims despite repeated claims to do that…” Williams (2017) see trends and traits of Islamophobia that mirror the anti-Semitism in Europe of earlier years and asks why lesson are not learned from this.
A particular sector feeling Islamophobic pressure is civil society. Organisations, whether constituted as charities or not have felt the brunt of a media and political focus that singles them out in a manner distinct from other communities (see Merali, 2017a for a summary). Accountability for this situation is demanded by several respondents, but also forms the basis of expectations of equality of expectation and treatment between minority community charities. Anonymous 2 (2017) highlights a number of cases that have come to his attention of Muslim charities having inquiries and investigations opened against them by the Charity Commission based on media attacks against trustees’ possible beliefs or possible damage to a charity’s reputation based on confusion as to whether that charity is involved in certain events or not. Anonymous 2 notes that this has resulted in the very least, charities against whom no wrong doing has been found finding themselves at the very least, bogged down in endless rounds of correspondence with the Charity Commission caused by repeated complaints by the same members of the commentariat. At worst they have trustees removed and replaced by trustees chosen by the Charity Commission and or had assets frozen. Issues that the Charity Commission have raised in this regard include, support for the Palestinian cause, perceived association with comedy events, perceived association with criticism of Charlie Hebdo. As Anonymous 2 notes, charities such as UK Toremet (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015) have meanwhile been found to be providing financial support that included funding the purchase of equipment for Israeli Defence Forces whilst they were engaged in military actions that have violated the Geneva Conventions, and in the case of UK Toremet have supported illegal settlements (White, 2017), with only minor sanction, and no finding that any of the activities mentioned are in any way contrary to what constitutes charitable aims in their opinion.
Accusations within the third sector have existed for some time that the disproportionality of inquiries, investigations and actions against Muslim charities are an indicator of institutional racism and requires serious, independent investigation (Anonymous 2, 2017). Accountability for such investigations and inquiries, and the revision of both the operation of investigatory powers, but also the particularities of differential treatment facing charities whose work deals in sole or large part with racialised communities. This is particularly important when the actions of the Charity Commission appear to be pursuing an increasingly political agenda[xvi].
Currently, without the ability to bring legal challenges against the Commission (curtailed by the issues mentioned above) Muslim civil society and the third sector have no way to challenge the decisions of the Commission. Even when the Charity Commission was forced to accept that it could not interfere (in a manner in which it had) in the funding by Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust or other charities of organisations like CAGE, and despite it being proven that part of this interference came from William Shawcross, the commission’s Chair, directly, he remains in place.
A second aspect of the hierarchies of racism revolves around impact and the making invisible of groups of people. Ahmed (2017) highlights the plight of people rendered destitute due to the prohibitive costs of immigration applications, and the vicious cycle of being denied the right to work whilst applications are pending. People in this situation are also denied medical treatment and cannot rent properties. The latter means they are rendered homeless (either sleeping on the streets or sofa surfing). This process makes invisible those affected to such an extent that they are rendered almost invisible in any conversation about equalities in the UK. It is not that just conceptually they are considered beyond the pale, they are physically rendered invisible. The making visible of such injustice as projects like Deport, Deprive, Extradite, or the expose work on detention centres and removals (Miller, Corporate Watch et. al., 2013) needs to be continued but the work of civil society in exposing these injustices requires in the long run, partners within institutions of the state in tackling the structural nature of these injustices (Ameli et. al. 2004a).
Discriminatory barriers including those that prevent complaints from those who have suffered discrimination being lodged and prevent them from progressing at school or work, are another form of making racialised individuals invisible and groups that require redress. In this regard educational space and workplace cultures have peculiar anomalies in creating hierarchies of racism where anti-racist measures (insofar as they are obliged to exist via equalities policies) are made as a one size fits all and do not always cover issues that are a bar to Muslim participation e.g. socialising and bonding around alcohol after work, participating in school discos or dance classes, uniform requirements that do not take in the diversity of Muslim expectations and beliefs etc. Finding ways of tackling the different experiences of inequality faced by different racialized or marginalised communities and groups within institutional settings is imperative if existing equalities norms are to be achieved (Choudhury, 2017). This could include in the school setting, clearer guidance from government on issues such as uniform (currently there is no specific advice from the government regarding the rights to wear religiously mandated clothing); working around issues like times of fasting and breaking fast, prayer times, fasting during exam periods etc. This lack has meant that advocacy organisations are getting increased calls from families where children are now being told to remove hijabs, shave beards or are forbidden from praying at school, or whose children have been referred through Prevent because they asked for a place to pray.
As with the Charity Commission and the question of accountability, similar questions arise as to how there can be accountability for the actions of OFSTED, the schools’ inspectorate. It was heavily criticised for its interventions in the Trojan Horse school affair, and its new chair (Amanda Spielman) at the time of writing is facing a campaign calling for her resignation after she issued guidance to inspectors to question pre-pubescent girls who wear hijab as to their reasons for wearing it. Spielman’s guidance is in violation of both the existing equalities culture (Merali, 2017c) in the UK as well as established human rights norms. An open letter signed by over a thousand academics and activists lambasted this move as racist (El-Enany et. al. cited in Halliday, 2017). As an initiative started by dissenting members of the academy this letter has sent a powerful message to a state institution that their actions are at the very least being held to account in some manner. However, it is battling not just Ofsted as an institution with no accountability but the discursive practice of domination hatred (Ameli, 2012) where narratives cut across political media, educational, social and legal spheres and reinforce each other. The motions behind Spielman’s move also originate in the press, as Hooper (2017) notes, in The Times. According to him the impact of this: ‘…is now shaping how parents are interacting with children at toddler age. [T]he challenges are huge and it’s very difficult actually at this point to imagine where we’ll be in five years or ten years.’
Zempi (2017) also calls for more accountability including from the government which:
“is the indirect perpetrator but something should be in place where politicians are held accountable for creating panic. So, lies told about immigrants have gone unchallenged. If I teach my students false information, I will be held accountable. No-one is really challenging them. Maybe a parliament committee or something along the lines can ensure accountability.”
In order to tackle these issues, the following were suggested as accepting that there is a preexisting frame of reference that does not have a logic behind it but is essentially based on privileging by making visible the invisible:
- Creating parity between Muslim family law councils and Beth Din courts (Ameli et. al. 2006b).
- Parity in state funding and state oversight over Muslim faith schools with, in particular Catholic and Jewish schools.
- Full and easily accessible accountability mechanisms for decisions taken by inspectorates (Oftsed, Charity Commission etc.), including more transparency in disciplinary proceedings against officers within these organisations, as well as accountability for the comments, guidance and work for the chairs of the organisations.
- Better regulation of the public/private sector and a more robust culture preventing conflicts of interest between media professionals, and politicians, political appointees and their other affiliations, including the increasing number of active think tanks.
- Highly visible meetings between institutions of the state with demonized groups.
- Addressing differential treatment of racialized minorities by regulatory bodies, e.g. the Charity Commission, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, Oftsed etc.
- A thorough review of immigration rules and detentions.
Arzu Merali worked on this project while head of research at Islamic Human Rights Commission. The project spanned 8 European countries and involved IHRC and five universities. IHRC was responsible for the UK, Germany and France sections of the project. Find out more about the project here[EXTERNAL LINK].
[xvi] see Merali (2017a) on the accusations of a conflict of interest regarding the appointment of former Henry Jackson Society member, William Shawcross as the Chair of the Commission.
